The South Asian countries will soon gather for the annual regional ritual – Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The 15th SAARC Summit is due to take place in Sri Lanka on 2nd-3rd August 2008. Since its inception in 1985 the SAARC is struggling to survive and promising to thrive. The regional forum was inaugurated to strengthen socio-economic cooperation among South Asian countries thereby laying the groundwork for political trust-building. Unfortunately, the programmes of socio-economic and cultural cooperation have been hijacked by political differences and the SAARC is struggling to manage regional animosities.
The upcoming Summit will as usual be conducted in a challenged regional environment. Almost every member country is caught in a whirlwind of political crisis. Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh are being managed through interim political arrangements paving the way for new governments to take control. Bhutan and Afghanistan are experimenting with the modern democratic practices marking an important phase of political transitions within each country. The Left parties in India have withdrawn support from the Congress-led UPA government which is expected to prove its majority before the Summit commences. Maldives is expected to witness the first ever multi-party elections this year. The host, Sri Lanka, is facing a challenging security situation as the LTTE has renewed its assaults against the Singhalese dominated government. Some groups of media activists in Sri Lanka have even threatened to boycott the Summit in protest of the increasing attacks against journalists in the country. It seems ironical that in the midst such national political crisis, SAARC has designated 2008 as the ‘Year of Good Governance’.
The national challenges are further complicated by the deteriorating regional strategic environment. The induction of the Marxist forces into mainstream politics in Nepal is expected to embolden Left wing groups in the region arousing heightened security concerns. Attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, for which Pakistan is being blamed, has created a strategic quagmire for the three states. India is also concerned about the increasing supply of arms to the Sri Lankan government by China and Pakistan. The Armed Forces Division of the Bangladesh has received instruction from the Office of the Chief Advisor to allow surveys by U.S. Marine Corps along the Indo-Bangladesh border for identifying the movement of extremists and terrorists across the border. Such growing influence of extra-regional actors in South Asia is expected to be a cause of concern for India.
India’s relations with most regional states are either strained or are being re-defined in response to changing national and regional realities. The Maoist led government in Nepal is intending to scrap the 58 year old Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty and review all existing bilateral arrangements. In 2007, the India-Bhutan Treaty of 1949 had been updated to replace the clause where Bhutan is expected to be guided by India in regard to the former’s external relations with the need for ‘friendly cooperation’ on the issue. The government of Bangladesh has out rightly rejected India’s demand to sign a five year agreement on allowing transit rights to North-East India at the sidelines of the upcoming Summit. India’s National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan has gone to the extent of demanding the scrapping of Pakistan’s ISI following its alleged involvement in the recent attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul.
The repercussions of global developments on the region are expected to further burden the SAARC process. The U.S. is reinforcing its strategic presence in Afghanistan following indications of the resurgence of the Taliban. U.S. army personnel are pressing for attacking suspected militant camps inside Pakistan. The member states are expected to refer to the ongoing discussions on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, especially when India had for several years favored the infamous ‘Indira Doctrine’ of minimizing external involvement in region. After attempting to remain insulated from global power politics for more than two decades, SAARC is in need to develop responses on the direct involvement of global actors with the regional states.
The agenda of the Summit compounds the prevalent national and regional and global challenges making this a crucial meeting of regional Heads of States. The theme of 15th SAARC Summit is ‘Towards a South Asian Union: Growing Together”. For realizing the goal of a Union in South Asia, psycho-political issues of leadership and perceptions have to be continuously addressed, rather than rhetorical referrences at Summit meetings. The rising food and oil prices are expected to dominate the Summit proceedings. This would generate additional pressures for operationalizing the SAARC Food Bank, which is yet to be ratified by four member states. The 14th SAARC Summit had emphasized on commencement of the implementation phase of the SAARC programmes and hence the progress on the SAARC Development Fund and South Asia University is expected to be placed before the Colombo Summit. SAARC has for long projected a selected theme for each Summit, supported by elaborated plans for realizing the proposals. The follow-up on issues of combating terrorism and promoting connectivity, highlighted during the previous Summit, is expected to be included on the agenda for reconsidering proposed goals and strategies.
Expecting great results from SAARC is a clear defiance of political reasoning. It is important to realize that SAARC is a forum of countries that are still under-going the process of state and nation building and hence it is an inherently challenged group. Nevertheless, the member countries have to make an honest attempt at collectivization of mutual efforts for gaining maximum benefits. Contrary to popular expectation, existence of SAARC cannot positively impact regional relations, but a positive transformation in regional perceptions can stimulate the activities of SAARC.
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
Democratic Pakistan and the Global War on Terror
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001 resulted in a historic partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan. Pakistan emerged as a key ally of the U.S. in the global war to counter terrorism. Though barely realized, in February 2008 this war entered a new phase. The U.S. had thus far fought the war against terrorism with the support of the dictatorial regime of the Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. The parliamentary elections in Pakistan in February 2008 transferred political authority in favor of the democratically elected government. The war on terrorism will be profoundly impacted by the response of democratic Pakistan to the strong anti-American sentiments within the country and to the lucrative aid offers by the U.S. for continued support in the counter-terrorism efforts.
The Pakistani government and the Bush administration are attempting to reformulate their mutual relationship in the counter-terrorism campaign. The Pakistani government is seeking to pursue a more independent policy on countering terrorism, while the U.S. is re-packaging proposals to win the support of the new government of Pakistan.
The new government has clearly stated its intention of re-working Pakistan’s relationship with the U.S. Several decisions are beginning to reflect changes in policy. The leaders of the new coalition government in Pakistan have decided to open negotiations with the militants, who continue to target civilians through suicide attacks. This is a marked departure from President Musharraf’s aggressive approach towards militants. It has been communicated to the U.S. that henceforth all political decisions, including proposals for implementing the U.S.- Pakistan counter-terrorism partnership, will be subject to the approval by the Pakistani Parliament. This implies that the U.S. counter-terrorism proposals would now face opposition from several quarters and require longer time for gaining approval. The U.S. has been asked to clearly define the war on terrorism, while the Pakistani government has gone ahead with drafting a peace agreement with the Taliban militants in the tribal regions of the country. Pakistani government has also released Maulana Sufi Mohammad, who is the founder of the militant outfit spearheading the resistance movement against the U.S. in Afghanistan in 2001. In forging foreign relations, the Pakistani government is showing signs of pursuing an independent policy. As a marked departure the Pakistani High Commissioner to India has insisted on conducting a bilateral dialogue with India, disfavoring excessive U.S. involvement on the issue. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, a staunch rival of the U.S. is due to visit Pakistan next week to meet the new government.
The Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have been able to re-group due their ability to gain sanctuary in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Consequently, American commanders in Afghanistan have in recent months urged a widening of the war that could include American attacks on the tribal areas inside Pakistan. As a gesture to win the support of the new government, the Bush administration has refused to implement any such plans. On the contrary the U.S. has promised to curb the strikes by U.S. Predators drones in Pakistan tribal areas, which were initiated in January this year under an agreement between the U.S. military and President Musharraf. Even though the U.S. military officials consider that attempts by the Pakistani government to negotiate with the militant will give the latter the opportunity to rearm, official opposition to the move is muted. In an effort to strengthen relations with the newly elected government of Pakistan in March 2008, the Bush administration seeks to put before the Congress a bill providing Pakistan an aid package worth more then $7 billion. Pakistan will also be given a "democracy dividend" of up to $1bn, a reward for holding peaceful elections and forming a coalition government.
For the Pakistani government and the Bush administration modification is as challenging the continuation of the current approaches. The U.S. and Pakistan are compelled to balance national compulsions with coalitional compromises and concessions. The Pakistani leaders have not provided any specific formula for negotiating with militants nor have they singled out the groups that they intend to initiate the dialogue with. The Pakistani political parties could be simply indulging in anti-U.S. rhetoric for gaining popular support. Even if the leaders seek to distance Pakistan from the U.S. the two countries are bound through various strategic and economic agreements. These linkages will greatly reduce the ability of the Pakistani government to maneuver. For example, America is sponsoring a $400 million plan to train Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force patrolling the Pakistani border with Afghanistan. In a situation where Pakistani Parliamentary Committee on Defense has to publish its report only after receiving financing from the U.S. state agency, the ability of the new government to disassociate themselves from the U.S. appears to be limited.
The U.S. had forged a less troublesome alliance with Pakistan under the regime of President Musharraf, while the future interactions with democratic Pakistan appear challenging. The U.S. at the present is focused on building a stable relation with the new government, even at the cost of temporarily altering its counter-terrorism strategy in the region. On the other hand, the Pakistani government is consciously altering its counter-terrorism strategy to gain political stability within the country. The U.S. and Pakistan are struggling to realize the challenges inherent in forging partnerships between democracies, in much contradiction to tenets of the classical democratic peace theory.
[Published at http://www.sspconline.org/article_details.asp?artid=art163]
The Pakistani government and the Bush administration are attempting to reformulate their mutual relationship in the counter-terrorism campaign. The Pakistani government is seeking to pursue a more independent policy on countering terrorism, while the U.S. is re-packaging proposals to win the support of the new government of Pakistan.
The new government has clearly stated its intention of re-working Pakistan’s relationship with the U.S. Several decisions are beginning to reflect changes in policy. The leaders of the new coalition government in Pakistan have decided to open negotiations with the militants, who continue to target civilians through suicide attacks. This is a marked departure from President Musharraf’s aggressive approach towards militants. It has been communicated to the U.S. that henceforth all political decisions, including proposals for implementing the U.S.- Pakistan counter-terrorism partnership, will be subject to the approval by the Pakistani Parliament. This implies that the U.S. counter-terrorism proposals would now face opposition from several quarters and require longer time for gaining approval. The U.S. has been asked to clearly define the war on terrorism, while the Pakistani government has gone ahead with drafting a peace agreement with the Taliban militants in the tribal regions of the country. Pakistani government has also released Maulana Sufi Mohammad, who is the founder of the militant outfit spearheading the resistance movement against the U.S. in Afghanistan in 2001. In forging foreign relations, the Pakistani government is showing signs of pursuing an independent policy. As a marked departure the Pakistani High Commissioner to India has insisted on conducting a bilateral dialogue with India, disfavoring excessive U.S. involvement on the issue. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, a staunch rival of the U.S. is due to visit Pakistan next week to meet the new government.
The Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have been able to re-group due their ability to gain sanctuary in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Consequently, American commanders in Afghanistan have in recent months urged a widening of the war that could include American attacks on the tribal areas inside Pakistan. As a gesture to win the support of the new government, the Bush administration has refused to implement any such plans. On the contrary the U.S. has promised to curb the strikes by U.S. Predators drones in Pakistan tribal areas, which were initiated in January this year under an agreement between the U.S. military and President Musharraf. Even though the U.S. military officials consider that attempts by the Pakistani government to negotiate with the militant will give the latter the opportunity to rearm, official opposition to the move is muted. In an effort to strengthen relations with the newly elected government of Pakistan in March 2008, the Bush administration seeks to put before the Congress a bill providing Pakistan an aid package worth more then $7 billion. Pakistan will also be given a "democracy dividend" of up to $1bn, a reward for holding peaceful elections and forming a coalition government.
For the Pakistani government and the Bush administration modification is as challenging the continuation of the current approaches. The U.S. and Pakistan are compelled to balance national compulsions with coalitional compromises and concessions. The Pakistani leaders have not provided any specific formula for negotiating with militants nor have they singled out the groups that they intend to initiate the dialogue with. The Pakistani political parties could be simply indulging in anti-U.S. rhetoric for gaining popular support. Even if the leaders seek to distance Pakistan from the U.S. the two countries are bound through various strategic and economic agreements. These linkages will greatly reduce the ability of the Pakistani government to maneuver. For example, America is sponsoring a $400 million plan to train Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force patrolling the Pakistani border with Afghanistan. In a situation where Pakistani Parliamentary Committee on Defense has to publish its report only after receiving financing from the U.S. state agency, the ability of the new government to disassociate themselves from the U.S. appears to be limited.
The U.S. had forged a less troublesome alliance with Pakistan under the regime of President Musharraf, while the future interactions with democratic Pakistan appear challenging. The U.S. at the present is focused on building a stable relation with the new government, even at the cost of temporarily altering its counter-terrorism strategy in the region. On the other hand, the Pakistani government is consciously altering its counter-terrorism strategy to gain political stability within the country. The U.S. and Pakistan are struggling to realize the challenges inherent in forging partnerships between democracies, in much contradiction to tenets of the classical democratic peace theory.
[Published at http://www.sspconline.org/article_details.asp?artid=art163]
Sunday, July 13, 2008
Attacks on Indian Embassy in Kabul: Global and Regional Implications
The July 7th car bombing incident at the Indian Embassy in Kabul is expected to have major ramification for global politics in general and South Asia in particular. More then 60 Afghan nationals died in the blast along with five members of the Indian diplomatic staff.
This blast is a continuation in the recent series of incidents arousing security concerns in Afghanistan. The Government in Afghanistan has been pointing fingers at Pakistan for the deteriorating situation in the country. The Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, has clearly stated that ‘the terrorist enemy behind these operations, which are sustained by a complex set of networks and infrastructure located behind the border of Afghanistan, cannot be defended by military operations inside Afghanistan alone.’ These incidents have aroused concern among the U.S. military personnel striving to bring stability to Pakistan. According to President Bush June 2008 has turned out to be a very challenging month for the Allied security forces in the country. A military out-post in the north-eastern province of Kunar was attacked by insurgents on July 13, killing nine U.S. soldiers. The U.S. has already mobilized additional security measures for coping with increased incidents of bombing in Afghanistan. The aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln has moved from the Persian Gulf into the Gulf of Oman so its warplanes can fly missions over Afghanistan. The U.S. has also been pressurising the Pakistani government to employ more resources to deal with the militant extremists within the country. But the challenges in Afghanistan are mounting at an alarming pace.
The recent bombing will have major ramifications for the South Asian region as well. It is expected to strain relations between India and Pakistan. India’s National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan has stated that India has ‘fair amount of intelligence’ on the involvement of Pakistan’s spy agency ISI in July 7th attacks. With the SAARC Summit due later this month, the incident can adversely impact the already challenged process of regional cooperation. SAARC will have another stability- challenged member in the presence of Afghanistan at the up-coming Summit. The attack on the Indian Embassy in Afghanistan for which Pakistan is being blamed has come to involve three SAARC members in an unwanted standoff just few weeks before the annual Summit opens on.
The U.S. aided states (like Afghanistan and Pakistan) appear to be posing greater threat to global peace than the rogue states. The nascent processes of the SAARC forum cannot be expected to put on course the screwed of policies a global superpower.
This blast is a continuation in the recent series of incidents arousing security concerns in Afghanistan. The Government in Afghanistan has been pointing fingers at Pakistan for the deteriorating situation in the country. The Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, has clearly stated that ‘the terrorist enemy behind these operations, which are sustained by a complex set of networks and infrastructure located behind the border of Afghanistan, cannot be defended by military operations inside Afghanistan alone.’ These incidents have aroused concern among the U.S. military personnel striving to bring stability to Pakistan. According to President Bush June 2008 has turned out to be a very challenging month for the Allied security forces in the country. A military out-post in the north-eastern province of Kunar was attacked by insurgents on July 13, killing nine U.S. soldiers. The U.S. has already mobilized additional security measures for coping with increased incidents of bombing in Afghanistan. The aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln has moved from the Persian Gulf into the Gulf of Oman so its warplanes can fly missions over Afghanistan. The U.S. has also been pressurising the Pakistani government to employ more resources to deal with the militant extremists within the country. But the challenges in Afghanistan are mounting at an alarming pace.
The recent bombing will have major ramifications for the South Asian region as well. It is expected to strain relations between India and Pakistan. India’s National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan has stated that India has ‘fair amount of intelligence’ on the involvement of Pakistan’s spy agency ISI in July 7th attacks. With the SAARC Summit due later this month, the incident can adversely impact the already challenged process of regional cooperation. SAARC will have another stability- challenged member in the presence of Afghanistan at the up-coming Summit. The attack on the Indian Embassy in Afghanistan for which Pakistan is being blamed has come to involve three SAARC members in an unwanted standoff just few weeks before the annual Summit opens on.
The U.S. aided states (like Afghanistan and Pakistan) appear to be posing greater threat to global peace than the rogue states. The nascent processes of the SAARC forum cannot be expected to put on course the screwed of policies a global superpower.
Developing a Human Terrain System for Jammu and Kashmir
The Government of India has been waging a long battle in state of Jammu and Kashmir since independence. The government has experimented with a variety of economic, political and strategic solutions at the state, regional and trans-national level for resolving the issue. Unfortunately, none of these have worked and the magnitude of the problem has increased. The most disturbing development of this prolonged struggle has been the alienation of the people of J&K. Reports of human rights violations in J&K by the Indian military personnel are widely cited. The army on the other hand accepts and defends a limited degree to coercion given the nature of challenges they encounter in the region. The situation in the state is challenging; the army in the process of defending the people has emerged as a source of apprehension and the common people in distancing themselves from the army have been suspected as supporting terrorists.
No other dimension of the J&K issue requires more urgent attention than bridging this gap between the people and military. The success or failure of the various peace plans, economic proposals, and strategic doctrines will be determined by the equations shared between the local population and the army personnel. The Government of India can take inspiration from the Human Terrain System of the U.S. and apply the programme with necessary modification in J&K.
The Human Terrain System (HTS), a programme run by the U.S. Foreign Military Studies Office, is currently being used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Programme seeks to gather ethnological and cultural intelligence from the ‘war zones’ and thereby assist the U.S. military in employing a more informed and humane approach for post-intervention stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan. The HTS is an updated version of the CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development) programme, used in Vietnam by President Johnson. Within the HTS several categorizations exist- Human Terrain teams, reach-back research cells, subject-matter expert networks and language specialists.
The operations of the Indian military in J&K cannot be compared to the U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in principle the strategy of HTS can be borrowed from the U.S. experiment. The socio-cultural ethos of J&K (and of every state in India) is distinct and the military training necessarily does not address this reality. The military has been trained to fight enemies and not to protect its own population. Since the operational dynamics of the military has changed, given the realities in J&K, the HTS could contribute significantly in addressing the lacuna.
HTS is an attempt to make available the expertise of the social scientists and regional experts to the military personnel for the purpose of factoring the local sensitivities into the military strategy. The military campaign in J&K is not just about defending a territorial unit but also about integrating the population of the state into the national mainstream. The achievement of national security objectives in J&K largely rests on a clear understanding of the societies where the army is engaged. As the programme over-view of the U.S. HTS explains, the local civilian population in the area of conflict – the human terrain – must be considered as a distinct and critical element of the environment. The HTS in J&K could engage with this human terrain and serve two vital purposes.
The HTS will have to be contextualized for use in J&K. The government will have to put together a Human Terrain Team (HTT) comprising of journalists, academicians, anthropologists, lawyers, economic experts, religious leaders, medical personnel, psychologists and civil engineers from within the state and across the nation. The HTT could would be able to comprehend and respond to the micro needs of the people and emerge as feedback loop not only for the military also the government. The issues of sanitation, education, economic development, viable employment are the micro concerns affecting the daily lives of the people of J&K. The HTT would be better equipped to address the human security concerns of the local population. Since the HTT would operate as an adjunct of the military forces, the negative perceptions towards the army could be neutralized.
The HTT would also operate as an advisory body for the purpose of strategic and political planning. Benefiting from the expertise and experience of the HTT the political and military leadership will be able to devise strategies for providing security with development to the local population. The HTT would create space for the social and human concerns in the macro politico-strategic perspective of the government of India.
The creation of HTT may appear ambitious and a time consuming proposition given the dominance of traditional strategic planning. But it time to realize that J&K is not a traditional theater of war and hence innovative strategies need to be devised for countering the challenge.
[Publised at http://www.ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle11.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2591&status=article&mod=b]
No other dimension of the J&K issue requires more urgent attention than bridging this gap between the people and military. The success or failure of the various peace plans, economic proposals, and strategic doctrines will be determined by the equations shared between the local population and the army personnel. The Government of India can take inspiration from the Human Terrain System of the U.S. and apply the programme with necessary modification in J&K.
The Human Terrain System (HTS), a programme run by the U.S. Foreign Military Studies Office, is currently being used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Programme seeks to gather ethnological and cultural intelligence from the ‘war zones’ and thereby assist the U.S. military in employing a more informed and humane approach for post-intervention stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan. The HTS is an updated version of the CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development) programme, used in Vietnam by President Johnson. Within the HTS several categorizations exist- Human Terrain teams, reach-back research cells, subject-matter expert networks and language specialists.
The operations of the Indian military in J&K cannot be compared to the U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in principle the strategy of HTS can be borrowed from the U.S. experiment. The socio-cultural ethos of J&K (and of every state in India) is distinct and the military training necessarily does not address this reality. The military has been trained to fight enemies and not to protect its own population. Since the operational dynamics of the military has changed, given the realities in J&K, the HTS could contribute significantly in addressing the lacuna.
HTS is an attempt to make available the expertise of the social scientists and regional experts to the military personnel for the purpose of factoring the local sensitivities into the military strategy. The military campaign in J&K is not just about defending a territorial unit but also about integrating the population of the state into the national mainstream. The achievement of national security objectives in J&K largely rests on a clear understanding of the societies where the army is engaged. As the programme over-view of the U.S. HTS explains, the local civilian population in the area of conflict – the human terrain – must be considered as a distinct and critical element of the environment. The HTS in J&K could engage with this human terrain and serve two vital purposes.
The HTS will have to be contextualized for use in J&K. The government will have to put together a Human Terrain Team (HTT) comprising of journalists, academicians, anthropologists, lawyers, economic experts, religious leaders, medical personnel, psychologists and civil engineers from within the state and across the nation. The HTT could would be able to comprehend and respond to the micro needs of the people and emerge as feedback loop not only for the military also the government. The issues of sanitation, education, economic development, viable employment are the micro concerns affecting the daily lives of the people of J&K. The HTT would be better equipped to address the human security concerns of the local population. Since the HTT would operate as an adjunct of the military forces, the negative perceptions towards the army could be neutralized.
The HTT would also operate as an advisory body for the purpose of strategic and political planning. Benefiting from the expertise and experience of the HTT the political and military leadership will be able to devise strategies for providing security with development to the local population. The HTT would create space for the social and human concerns in the macro politico-strategic perspective of the government of India.
The creation of HTT may appear ambitious and a time consuming proposition given the dominance of traditional strategic planning. But it time to realize that J&K is not a traditional theater of war and hence innovative strategies need to be devised for countering the challenge.
[Publised at http://www.ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle11.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2591&status=article&mod=b]
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