The South Asian countries will soon gather for the annual regional ritual – Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The 15th SAARC Summit is due to take place in Sri Lanka on 2nd-3rd August 2008. Since its inception in 1985 the SAARC is struggling to survive and promising to thrive. The regional forum was inaugurated to strengthen socio-economic cooperation among South Asian countries thereby laying the groundwork for political trust-building. Unfortunately, the programmes of socio-economic and cultural cooperation have been hijacked by political differences and the SAARC is struggling to manage regional animosities.
The upcoming Summit will as usual be conducted in a challenged regional environment. Almost every member country is caught in a whirlwind of political crisis. Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh are being managed through interim political arrangements paving the way for new governments to take control. Bhutan and Afghanistan are experimenting with the modern democratic practices marking an important phase of political transitions within each country. The Left parties in India have withdrawn support from the Congress-led UPA government which is expected to prove its majority before the Summit commences. Maldives is expected to witness the first ever multi-party elections this year. The host, Sri Lanka, is facing a challenging security situation as the LTTE has renewed its assaults against the Singhalese dominated government. Some groups of media activists in Sri Lanka have even threatened to boycott the Summit in protest of the increasing attacks against journalists in the country. It seems ironical that in the midst such national political crisis, SAARC has designated 2008 as the ‘Year of Good Governance’.
The national challenges are further complicated by the deteriorating regional strategic environment. The induction of the Marxist forces into mainstream politics in Nepal is expected to embolden Left wing groups in the region arousing heightened security concerns. Attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, for which Pakistan is being blamed, has created a strategic quagmire for the three states. India is also concerned about the increasing supply of arms to the Sri Lankan government by China and Pakistan. The Armed Forces Division of the Bangladesh has received instruction from the Office of the Chief Advisor to allow surveys by U.S. Marine Corps along the Indo-Bangladesh border for identifying the movement of extremists and terrorists across the border. Such growing influence of extra-regional actors in South Asia is expected to be a cause of concern for India.
India’s relations with most regional states are either strained or are being re-defined in response to changing national and regional realities. The Maoist led government in Nepal is intending to scrap the 58 year old Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty and review all existing bilateral arrangements. In 2007, the India-Bhutan Treaty of 1949 had been updated to replace the clause where Bhutan is expected to be guided by India in regard to the former’s external relations with the need for ‘friendly cooperation’ on the issue. The government of Bangladesh has out rightly rejected India’s demand to sign a five year agreement on allowing transit rights to North-East India at the sidelines of the upcoming Summit. India’s National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan has gone to the extent of demanding the scrapping of Pakistan’s ISI following its alleged involvement in the recent attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul.
The repercussions of global developments on the region are expected to further burden the SAARC process. The U.S. is reinforcing its strategic presence in Afghanistan following indications of the resurgence of the Taliban. U.S. army personnel are pressing for attacking suspected militant camps inside Pakistan. The member states are expected to refer to the ongoing discussions on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, especially when India had for several years favored the infamous ‘Indira Doctrine’ of minimizing external involvement in region. After attempting to remain insulated from global power politics for more than two decades, SAARC is in need to develop responses on the direct involvement of global actors with the regional states.
The agenda of the Summit compounds the prevalent national and regional and global challenges making this a crucial meeting of regional Heads of States. The theme of 15th SAARC Summit is ‘Towards a South Asian Union: Growing Together”. For realizing the goal of a Union in South Asia, psycho-political issues of leadership and perceptions have to be continuously addressed, rather than rhetorical referrences at Summit meetings. The rising food and oil prices are expected to dominate the Summit proceedings. This would generate additional pressures for operationalizing the SAARC Food Bank, which is yet to be ratified by four member states. The 14th SAARC Summit had emphasized on commencement of the implementation phase of the SAARC programmes and hence the progress on the SAARC Development Fund and South Asia University is expected to be placed before the Colombo Summit. SAARC has for long projected a selected theme for each Summit, supported by elaborated plans for realizing the proposals. The follow-up on issues of combating terrorism and promoting connectivity, highlighted during the previous Summit, is expected to be included on the agenda for reconsidering proposed goals and strategies.
Expecting great results from SAARC is a clear defiance of political reasoning. It is important to realize that SAARC is a forum of countries that are still under-going the process of state and nation building and hence it is an inherently challenged group. Nevertheless, the member countries have to make an honest attempt at collectivization of mutual efforts for gaining maximum benefits. Contrary to popular expectation, existence of SAARC cannot positively impact regional relations, but a positive transformation in regional perceptions can stimulate the activities of SAARC.
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
Democratic Pakistan and the Global War on Terror
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001 resulted in a historic partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan. Pakistan emerged as a key ally of the U.S. in the global war to counter terrorism. Though barely realized, in February 2008 this war entered a new phase. The U.S. had thus far fought the war against terrorism with the support of the dictatorial regime of the Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. The parliamentary elections in Pakistan in February 2008 transferred political authority in favor of the democratically elected government. The war on terrorism will be profoundly impacted by the response of democratic Pakistan to the strong anti-American sentiments within the country and to the lucrative aid offers by the U.S. for continued support in the counter-terrorism efforts.
The Pakistani government and the Bush administration are attempting to reformulate their mutual relationship in the counter-terrorism campaign. The Pakistani government is seeking to pursue a more independent policy on countering terrorism, while the U.S. is re-packaging proposals to win the support of the new government of Pakistan.
The new government has clearly stated its intention of re-working Pakistan’s relationship with the U.S. Several decisions are beginning to reflect changes in policy. The leaders of the new coalition government in Pakistan have decided to open negotiations with the militants, who continue to target civilians through suicide attacks. This is a marked departure from President Musharraf’s aggressive approach towards militants. It has been communicated to the U.S. that henceforth all political decisions, including proposals for implementing the U.S.- Pakistan counter-terrorism partnership, will be subject to the approval by the Pakistani Parliament. This implies that the U.S. counter-terrorism proposals would now face opposition from several quarters and require longer time for gaining approval. The U.S. has been asked to clearly define the war on terrorism, while the Pakistani government has gone ahead with drafting a peace agreement with the Taliban militants in the tribal regions of the country. Pakistani government has also released Maulana Sufi Mohammad, who is the founder of the militant outfit spearheading the resistance movement against the U.S. in Afghanistan in 2001. In forging foreign relations, the Pakistani government is showing signs of pursuing an independent policy. As a marked departure the Pakistani High Commissioner to India has insisted on conducting a bilateral dialogue with India, disfavoring excessive U.S. involvement on the issue. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, a staunch rival of the U.S. is due to visit Pakistan next week to meet the new government.
The Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have been able to re-group due their ability to gain sanctuary in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Consequently, American commanders in Afghanistan have in recent months urged a widening of the war that could include American attacks on the tribal areas inside Pakistan. As a gesture to win the support of the new government, the Bush administration has refused to implement any such plans. On the contrary the U.S. has promised to curb the strikes by U.S. Predators drones in Pakistan tribal areas, which were initiated in January this year under an agreement between the U.S. military and President Musharraf. Even though the U.S. military officials consider that attempts by the Pakistani government to negotiate with the militant will give the latter the opportunity to rearm, official opposition to the move is muted. In an effort to strengthen relations with the newly elected government of Pakistan in March 2008, the Bush administration seeks to put before the Congress a bill providing Pakistan an aid package worth more then $7 billion. Pakistan will also be given a "democracy dividend" of up to $1bn, a reward for holding peaceful elections and forming a coalition government.
For the Pakistani government and the Bush administration modification is as challenging the continuation of the current approaches. The U.S. and Pakistan are compelled to balance national compulsions with coalitional compromises and concessions. The Pakistani leaders have not provided any specific formula for negotiating with militants nor have they singled out the groups that they intend to initiate the dialogue with. The Pakistani political parties could be simply indulging in anti-U.S. rhetoric for gaining popular support. Even if the leaders seek to distance Pakistan from the U.S. the two countries are bound through various strategic and economic agreements. These linkages will greatly reduce the ability of the Pakistani government to maneuver. For example, America is sponsoring a $400 million plan to train Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force patrolling the Pakistani border with Afghanistan. In a situation where Pakistani Parliamentary Committee on Defense has to publish its report only after receiving financing from the U.S. state agency, the ability of the new government to disassociate themselves from the U.S. appears to be limited.
The U.S. had forged a less troublesome alliance with Pakistan under the regime of President Musharraf, while the future interactions with democratic Pakistan appear challenging. The U.S. at the present is focused on building a stable relation with the new government, even at the cost of temporarily altering its counter-terrorism strategy in the region. On the other hand, the Pakistani government is consciously altering its counter-terrorism strategy to gain political stability within the country. The U.S. and Pakistan are struggling to realize the challenges inherent in forging partnerships between democracies, in much contradiction to tenets of the classical democratic peace theory.
[Published at http://www.sspconline.org/article_details.asp?artid=art163]
The Pakistani government and the Bush administration are attempting to reformulate their mutual relationship in the counter-terrorism campaign. The Pakistani government is seeking to pursue a more independent policy on countering terrorism, while the U.S. is re-packaging proposals to win the support of the new government of Pakistan.
The new government has clearly stated its intention of re-working Pakistan’s relationship with the U.S. Several decisions are beginning to reflect changes in policy. The leaders of the new coalition government in Pakistan have decided to open negotiations with the militants, who continue to target civilians through suicide attacks. This is a marked departure from President Musharraf’s aggressive approach towards militants. It has been communicated to the U.S. that henceforth all political decisions, including proposals for implementing the U.S.- Pakistan counter-terrorism partnership, will be subject to the approval by the Pakistani Parliament. This implies that the U.S. counter-terrorism proposals would now face opposition from several quarters and require longer time for gaining approval. The U.S. has been asked to clearly define the war on terrorism, while the Pakistani government has gone ahead with drafting a peace agreement with the Taliban militants in the tribal regions of the country. Pakistani government has also released Maulana Sufi Mohammad, who is the founder of the militant outfit spearheading the resistance movement against the U.S. in Afghanistan in 2001. In forging foreign relations, the Pakistani government is showing signs of pursuing an independent policy. As a marked departure the Pakistani High Commissioner to India has insisted on conducting a bilateral dialogue with India, disfavoring excessive U.S. involvement on the issue. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, a staunch rival of the U.S. is due to visit Pakistan next week to meet the new government.
The Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have been able to re-group due their ability to gain sanctuary in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Consequently, American commanders in Afghanistan have in recent months urged a widening of the war that could include American attacks on the tribal areas inside Pakistan. As a gesture to win the support of the new government, the Bush administration has refused to implement any such plans. On the contrary the U.S. has promised to curb the strikes by U.S. Predators drones in Pakistan tribal areas, which were initiated in January this year under an agreement between the U.S. military and President Musharraf. Even though the U.S. military officials consider that attempts by the Pakistani government to negotiate with the militant will give the latter the opportunity to rearm, official opposition to the move is muted. In an effort to strengthen relations with the newly elected government of Pakistan in March 2008, the Bush administration seeks to put before the Congress a bill providing Pakistan an aid package worth more then $7 billion. Pakistan will also be given a "democracy dividend" of up to $1bn, a reward for holding peaceful elections and forming a coalition government.
For the Pakistani government and the Bush administration modification is as challenging the continuation of the current approaches. The U.S. and Pakistan are compelled to balance national compulsions with coalitional compromises and concessions. The Pakistani leaders have not provided any specific formula for negotiating with militants nor have they singled out the groups that they intend to initiate the dialogue with. The Pakistani political parties could be simply indulging in anti-U.S. rhetoric for gaining popular support. Even if the leaders seek to distance Pakistan from the U.S. the two countries are bound through various strategic and economic agreements. These linkages will greatly reduce the ability of the Pakistani government to maneuver. For example, America is sponsoring a $400 million plan to train Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force patrolling the Pakistani border with Afghanistan. In a situation where Pakistani Parliamentary Committee on Defense has to publish its report only after receiving financing from the U.S. state agency, the ability of the new government to disassociate themselves from the U.S. appears to be limited.
The U.S. had forged a less troublesome alliance with Pakistan under the regime of President Musharraf, while the future interactions with democratic Pakistan appear challenging. The U.S. at the present is focused on building a stable relation with the new government, even at the cost of temporarily altering its counter-terrorism strategy in the region. On the other hand, the Pakistani government is consciously altering its counter-terrorism strategy to gain political stability within the country. The U.S. and Pakistan are struggling to realize the challenges inherent in forging partnerships between democracies, in much contradiction to tenets of the classical democratic peace theory.
[Published at http://www.sspconline.org/article_details.asp?artid=art163]
Sunday, July 13, 2008
Attacks on Indian Embassy in Kabul: Global and Regional Implications
The July 7th car bombing incident at the Indian Embassy in Kabul is expected to have major ramification for global politics in general and South Asia in particular. More then 60 Afghan nationals died in the blast along with five members of the Indian diplomatic staff.
This blast is a continuation in the recent series of incidents arousing security concerns in Afghanistan. The Government in Afghanistan has been pointing fingers at Pakistan for the deteriorating situation in the country. The Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, has clearly stated that ‘the terrorist enemy behind these operations, which are sustained by a complex set of networks and infrastructure located behind the border of Afghanistan, cannot be defended by military operations inside Afghanistan alone.’ These incidents have aroused concern among the U.S. military personnel striving to bring stability to Pakistan. According to President Bush June 2008 has turned out to be a very challenging month for the Allied security forces in the country. A military out-post in the north-eastern province of Kunar was attacked by insurgents on July 13, killing nine U.S. soldiers. The U.S. has already mobilized additional security measures for coping with increased incidents of bombing in Afghanistan. The aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln has moved from the Persian Gulf into the Gulf of Oman so its warplanes can fly missions over Afghanistan. The U.S. has also been pressurising the Pakistani government to employ more resources to deal with the militant extremists within the country. But the challenges in Afghanistan are mounting at an alarming pace.
The recent bombing will have major ramifications for the South Asian region as well. It is expected to strain relations between India and Pakistan. India’s National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan has stated that India has ‘fair amount of intelligence’ on the involvement of Pakistan’s spy agency ISI in July 7th attacks. With the SAARC Summit due later this month, the incident can adversely impact the already challenged process of regional cooperation. SAARC will have another stability- challenged member in the presence of Afghanistan at the up-coming Summit. The attack on the Indian Embassy in Afghanistan for which Pakistan is being blamed has come to involve three SAARC members in an unwanted standoff just few weeks before the annual Summit opens on.
The U.S. aided states (like Afghanistan and Pakistan) appear to be posing greater threat to global peace than the rogue states. The nascent processes of the SAARC forum cannot be expected to put on course the screwed of policies a global superpower.
This blast is a continuation in the recent series of incidents arousing security concerns in Afghanistan. The Government in Afghanistan has been pointing fingers at Pakistan for the deteriorating situation in the country. The Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, has clearly stated that ‘the terrorist enemy behind these operations, which are sustained by a complex set of networks and infrastructure located behind the border of Afghanistan, cannot be defended by military operations inside Afghanistan alone.’ These incidents have aroused concern among the U.S. military personnel striving to bring stability to Pakistan. According to President Bush June 2008 has turned out to be a very challenging month for the Allied security forces in the country. A military out-post in the north-eastern province of Kunar was attacked by insurgents on July 13, killing nine U.S. soldiers. The U.S. has already mobilized additional security measures for coping with increased incidents of bombing in Afghanistan. The aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln has moved from the Persian Gulf into the Gulf of Oman so its warplanes can fly missions over Afghanistan. The U.S. has also been pressurising the Pakistani government to employ more resources to deal with the militant extremists within the country. But the challenges in Afghanistan are mounting at an alarming pace.
The recent bombing will have major ramifications for the South Asian region as well. It is expected to strain relations between India and Pakistan. India’s National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan has stated that India has ‘fair amount of intelligence’ on the involvement of Pakistan’s spy agency ISI in July 7th attacks. With the SAARC Summit due later this month, the incident can adversely impact the already challenged process of regional cooperation. SAARC will have another stability- challenged member in the presence of Afghanistan at the up-coming Summit. The attack on the Indian Embassy in Afghanistan for which Pakistan is being blamed has come to involve three SAARC members in an unwanted standoff just few weeks before the annual Summit opens on.
The U.S. aided states (like Afghanistan and Pakistan) appear to be posing greater threat to global peace than the rogue states. The nascent processes of the SAARC forum cannot be expected to put on course the screwed of policies a global superpower.
Developing a Human Terrain System for Jammu and Kashmir
The Government of India has been waging a long battle in state of Jammu and Kashmir since independence. The government has experimented with a variety of economic, political and strategic solutions at the state, regional and trans-national level for resolving the issue. Unfortunately, none of these have worked and the magnitude of the problem has increased. The most disturbing development of this prolonged struggle has been the alienation of the people of J&K. Reports of human rights violations in J&K by the Indian military personnel are widely cited. The army on the other hand accepts and defends a limited degree to coercion given the nature of challenges they encounter in the region. The situation in the state is challenging; the army in the process of defending the people has emerged as a source of apprehension and the common people in distancing themselves from the army have been suspected as supporting terrorists.
No other dimension of the J&K issue requires more urgent attention than bridging this gap between the people and military. The success or failure of the various peace plans, economic proposals, and strategic doctrines will be determined by the equations shared between the local population and the army personnel. The Government of India can take inspiration from the Human Terrain System of the U.S. and apply the programme with necessary modification in J&K.
The Human Terrain System (HTS), a programme run by the U.S. Foreign Military Studies Office, is currently being used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Programme seeks to gather ethnological and cultural intelligence from the ‘war zones’ and thereby assist the U.S. military in employing a more informed and humane approach for post-intervention stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan. The HTS is an updated version of the CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development) programme, used in Vietnam by President Johnson. Within the HTS several categorizations exist- Human Terrain teams, reach-back research cells, subject-matter expert networks and language specialists.
The operations of the Indian military in J&K cannot be compared to the U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in principle the strategy of HTS can be borrowed from the U.S. experiment. The socio-cultural ethos of J&K (and of every state in India) is distinct and the military training necessarily does not address this reality. The military has been trained to fight enemies and not to protect its own population. Since the operational dynamics of the military has changed, given the realities in J&K, the HTS could contribute significantly in addressing the lacuna.
HTS is an attempt to make available the expertise of the social scientists and regional experts to the military personnel for the purpose of factoring the local sensitivities into the military strategy. The military campaign in J&K is not just about defending a territorial unit but also about integrating the population of the state into the national mainstream. The achievement of national security objectives in J&K largely rests on a clear understanding of the societies where the army is engaged. As the programme over-view of the U.S. HTS explains, the local civilian population in the area of conflict – the human terrain – must be considered as a distinct and critical element of the environment. The HTS in J&K could engage with this human terrain and serve two vital purposes.
The HTS will have to be contextualized for use in J&K. The government will have to put together a Human Terrain Team (HTT) comprising of journalists, academicians, anthropologists, lawyers, economic experts, religious leaders, medical personnel, psychologists and civil engineers from within the state and across the nation. The HTT could would be able to comprehend and respond to the micro needs of the people and emerge as feedback loop not only for the military also the government. The issues of sanitation, education, economic development, viable employment are the micro concerns affecting the daily lives of the people of J&K. The HTT would be better equipped to address the human security concerns of the local population. Since the HTT would operate as an adjunct of the military forces, the negative perceptions towards the army could be neutralized.
The HTT would also operate as an advisory body for the purpose of strategic and political planning. Benefiting from the expertise and experience of the HTT the political and military leadership will be able to devise strategies for providing security with development to the local population. The HTT would create space for the social and human concerns in the macro politico-strategic perspective of the government of India.
The creation of HTT may appear ambitious and a time consuming proposition given the dominance of traditional strategic planning. But it time to realize that J&K is not a traditional theater of war and hence innovative strategies need to be devised for countering the challenge.
[Publised at http://www.ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle11.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2591&status=article&mod=b]
No other dimension of the J&K issue requires more urgent attention than bridging this gap between the people and military. The success or failure of the various peace plans, economic proposals, and strategic doctrines will be determined by the equations shared between the local population and the army personnel. The Government of India can take inspiration from the Human Terrain System of the U.S. and apply the programme with necessary modification in J&K.
The Human Terrain System (HTS), a programme run by the U.S. Foreign Military Studies Office, is currently being used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Programme seeks to gather ethnological and cultural intelligence from the ‘war zones’ and thereby assist the U.S. military in employing a more informed and humane approach for post-intervention stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan. The HTS is an updated version of the CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development) programme, used in Vietnam by President Johnson. Within the HTS several categorizations exist- Human Terrain teams, reach-back research cells, subject-matter expert networks and language specialists.
The operations of the Indian military in J&K cannot be compared to the U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in principle the strategy of HTS can be borrowed from the U.S. experiment. The socio-cultural ethos of J&K (and of every state in India) is distinct and the military training necessarily does not address this reality. The military has been trained to fight enemies and not to protect its own population. Since the operational dynamics of the military has changed, given the realities in J&K, the HTS could contribute significantly in addressing the lacuna.
HTS is an attempt to make available the expertise of the social scientists and regional experts to the military personnel for the purpose of factoring the local sensitivities into the military strategy. The military campaign in J&K is not just about defending a territorial unit but also about integrating the population of the state into the national mainstream. The achievement of national security objectives in J&K largely rests on a clear understanding of the societies where the army is engaged. As the programme over-view of the U.S. HTS explains, the local civilian population in the area of conflict – the human terrain – must be considered as a distinct and critical element of the environment. The HTS in J&K could engage with this human terrain and serve two vital purposes.
The HTS will have to be contextualized for use in J&K. The government will have to put together a Human Terrain Team (HTT) comprising of journalists, academicians, anthropologists, lawyers, economic experts, religious leaders, medical personnel, psychologists and civil engineers from within the state and across the nation. The HTT could would be able to comprehend and respond to the micro needs of the people and emerge as feedback loop not only for the military also the government. The issues of sanitation, education, economic development, viable employment are the micro concerns affecting the daily lives of the people of J&K. The HTT would be better equipped to address the human security concerns of the local population. Since the HTT would operate as an adjunct of the military forces, the negative perceptions towards the army could be neutralized.
The HTT would also operate as an advisory body for the purpose of strategic and political planning. Benefiting from the expertise and experience of the HTT the political and military leadership will be able to devise strategies for providing security with development to the local population. The HTT would create space for the social and human concerns in the macro politico-strategic perspective of the government of India.
The creation of HTT may appear ambitious and a time consuming proposition given the dominance of traditional strategic planning. But it time to realize that J&K is not a traditional theater of war and hence innovative strategies need to be devised for countering the challenge.
[Publised at http://www.ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle11.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2591&status=article&mod=b]
Monday, April 28, 2008
Maximizing on the visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to India
Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is expected to be in New Delhi on 29th April for a working visit. Energy issues are on the agenda of talks between India and Iran during the short six-hour visit. The visit has a wider geo-political significance and hopefully the Government of India will avoid diplomatic sluggishness and maximize on the opportunity.
The timing of the visit is crucial. The Bush administration has focused attention on isolating the regime of President Ahmadinejad. In March 2008, the third round of Security Council sanctions was imposed on Iran. Despite the findings published in the National Intelligence Estimate of December 2007, the U.S. continues to view Iran as a major threat and seeks to increase international pressure on Iran to suspend Uranium enrichment. Given the cordiality of Indo-U.S. relations, the visit of President Ahmadinejad can emerge as an unnecessary irritant in bilateral relations. On the other hand, the U.S. has recently lost much international support for branding Iran as a rogue state. President Ahmadinejad has visited the Arab states and even addressed the Gulf Cooperation Council. India will thus need to diplomatically balance the growing regional popularity of President Ahmadinejad and the U.S. abhorrence for the Iranian regime.
The visit of President Ahmadinejad was not a planned one. The Indian Government had received request for re-fuelling the Iranian President’s plane in India on a flight from Sri Lanka to Tehran. The technical stop-over was tactically turned into an official visit by India. This was an intelligent gesture for correcting the seemingly negative perceptions of the Indian government towards Iran. India has further demonstrated diplomatic deftness by refusing to be unduly pressurized by the U.S. The U.S. has advised India to use the upcoming visit of President Ahmadinejad as an opportunity to insist Iran for complying with the Security Council resolutions and give-up Uranium enrichment. The Government of India in response has refused to be guided by any third party in defining its bilateral relations with Iran. Moreover, India has asserted the legality of the IAEA, rather than the U.S., in judging Iran’s non-compliance to the non-proliferation commitments.
The U.S. has attempted in the past to dictate India’s Iran policy. In January 2006 U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford, stated that the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal could be stalled in the U.S. Congress if India did not vote against Iran at the IAEA. After the visit of Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister to Delhi in September 2007, Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary for State, expressed concerns over India’s military relationship with Iran. On both the occasions India had countered the U.S. pressures through verbal statements. The visit of President Ahmadinejad provides an opportunity to go beyond rhetoric and make substantial improvements in the relations with Iran.
India appears to be involved in a damage control exercise following its vote against Iran in the IAEA in September 2005. The Indian government realizes that Iran is in a position to fulfill India’s energy requirements in the next decade. The proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline is expected to provide crucial energy supplies for India. Apart from being traditional friends Iran has supported India on the Kashmir issues in the OIC. The huge Shia Muslim population in India shares a natural bondage with the Iranian Shiites. Iran and India have agreed to join hands in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and to support the development of alternate access routes to that country via Iran’s Chahbahar. Hence India’s relations with Iran do not represent mere traditional symbolism, but have immense diplomatic advantage for the future. The Iran policy needs to go beyond publicizing India’s non-alignment to concretizing the national foreign policy objectives.
The tests of India’s diplomatic capabilities lie in consolidating relations with Iran, without unduly antagonizing the U.S. India has traditionally encountered the problem of balancing relations with other countries. India tends to displease and appease other countries at regular intervals. The clue for India lies in being unapologetic about pursuing her national interests by building bilateral, regional and global partnerships. For realizing these goals it is essential that India remains committed, in letter and spirit, to the agreements concluded with the U.S. and Iran. The 2004 New Delhi Declaration on strategic partnership with Iran needs to be treated as important as the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Civilian Agreement of 2005. For ensuring the stability of Afghanistan, India needs to cooperate with the U.S. and Iran.
According to Morgenthau’s Realism, nation states are not judged by the universal moral principles; the success of a nation-state is dependent on its ability to define national interest in terms of power. Hopefully Indian diplomacy realizes that interactions with the Iranian President should be guided by the goals of serving India’s national interest rather than for appeasing either Iran or the U.S.
[The article was published at http://www.ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle1.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2569&status=article&mod=b]
The timing of the visit is crucial. The Bush administration has focused attention on isolating the regime of President Ahmadinejad. In March 2008, the third round of Security Council sanctions was imposed on Iran. Despite the findings published in the National Intelligence Estimate of December 2007, the U.S. continues to view Iran as a major threat and seeks to increase international pressure on Iran to suspend Uranium enrichment. Given the cordiality of Indo-U.S. relations, the visit of President Ahmadinejad can emerge as an unnecessary irritant in bilateral relations. On the other hand, the U.S. has recently lost much international support for branding Iran as a rogue state. President Ahmadinejad has visited the Arab states and even addressed the Gulf Cooperation Council. India will thus need to diplomatically balance the growing regional popularity of President Ahmadinejad and the U.S. abhorrence for the Iranian regime.
The visit of President Ahmadinejad was not a planned one. The Indian Government had received request for re-fuelling the Iranian President’s plane in India on a flight from Sri Lanka to Tehran. The technical stop-over was tactically turned into an official visit by India. This was an intelligent gesture for correcting the seemingly negative perceptions of the Indian government towards Iran. India has further demonstrated diplomatic deftness by refusing to be unduly pressurized by the U.S. The U.S. has advised India to use the upcoming visit of President Ahmadinejad as an opportunity to insist Iran for complying with the Security Council resolutions and give-up Uranium enrichment. The Government of India in response has refused to be guided by any third party in defining its bilateral relations with Iran. Moreover, India has asserted the legality of the IAEA, rather than the U.S., in judging Iran’s non-compliance to the non-proliferation commitments.
The U.S. has attempted in the past to dictate India’s Iran policy. In January 2006 U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford, stated that the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal could be stalled in the U.S. Congress if India did not vote against Iran at the IAEA. After the visit of Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister to Delhi in September 2007, Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary for State, expressed concerns over India’s military relationship with Iran. On both the occasions India had countered the U.S. pressures through verbal statements. The visit of President Ahmadinejad provides an opportunity to go beyond rhetoric and make substantial improvements in the relations with Iran.
India appears to be involved in a damage control exercise following its vote against Iran in the IAEA in September 2005. The Indian government realizes that Iran is in a position to fulfill India’s energy requirements in the next decade. The proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline is expected to provide crucial energy supplies for India. Apart from being traditional friends Iran has supported India on the Kashmir issues in the OIC. The huge Shia Muslim population in India shares a natural bondage with the Iranian Shiites. Iran and India have agreed to join hands in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and to support the development of alternate access routes to that country via Iran’s Chahbahar. Hence India’s relations with Iran do not represent mere traditional symbolism, but have immense diplomatic advantage for the future. The Iran policy needs to go beyond publicizing India’s non-alignment to concretizing the national foreign policy objectives.
The tests of India’s diplomatic capabilities lie in consolidating relations with Iran, without unduly antagonizing the U.S. India has traditionally encountered the problem of balancing relations with other countries. India tends to displease and appease other countries at regular intervals. The clue for India lies in being unapologetic about pursuing her national interests by building bilateral, regional and global partnerships. For realizing these goals it is essential that India remains committed, in letter and spirit, to the agreements concluded with the U.S. and Iran. The 2004 New Delhi Declaration on strategic partnership with Iran needs to be treated as important as the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Civilian Agreement of 2005. For ensuring the stability of Afghanistan, India needs to cooperate with the U.S. and Iran.
According to Morgenthau’s Realism, nation states are not judged by the universal moral principles; the success of a nation-state is dependent on its ability to define national interest in terms of power. Hopefully Indian diplomacy realizes that interactions with the Iranian President should be guided by the goals of serving India’s national interest rather than for appeasing either Iran or the U.S.
[The article was published at http://www.ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle1.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2569&status=article&mod=b]
Tuesday, April 15, 2008
South Asia: Moving from Programmes of Cooperation to a Cooperative Programme
Regionalism in South Asia is celebrated through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). But, in practice regionalism rarely functions through the activities of SAARC. Regionalism in South Asia is viewed as a tool to manage the structural dynamics of the region and not as a mechanism to address regional concerns. The purpose of a regional dialogue is to discuss common problems and evolve remedial measures to which all parties can contribute and reap comparable benefits. But, in practice regional dialogue in South Asia is an exercise in one-upmanship where the regional blame-game is exhibited at its worst.
The Charter of SAARC does not categorize the forum as an explicit political or economic or strategic grouping. Its imprecise character was considered an asset; a flexibility which could adapt to emerging demands. The initial phase justified this approach, given the recent origin of the nation-state system in South Asia. But South Asian countries have not worked towards evolving a specific mandate for the regional forum. Even 22 years after its formation the SAARC programme remains as amorphous and vague as it was in 1985.
Regionalism refers to intensifying political, economic or strategic processes of cooperation among states. Such intensification and coordination of activities is not visible in the SAARC. There has been multiplication of institutional structures and proliferation of regional meetings, but few successes in terms of specific action-based programmes. Regional dialogue is dominated by the negative agenda of thrusting the responsibility for the regional challenges on specific national policies, rather than evolving a mutual approach to address the concerns.
The political goal of cooperation, namely, a political union, may be an ambitious objective for many regional groupings, but convergence of certain political practices which have regional and extra-regional implications could surely be on the agenda. Likewise, an economic union may qualify as the ultimate step in economic cooperation, but a free trade area is a more realizable target. A common defense system for a region is yet a far dream, but a coordinated defense strategy for strategic concerns has been evolved by regional groupings around the world.
If South Asian cooperation is measured against these political, economic or strategic yard sticks, the record would be extremely unimpressive. The saddest part is not that SAARC has not achieved the desired results in these spheres, but surprisingly SAARC has not even taken the initial steps in that direction. The strongest defense in favor of SAARC is its ability to survive despite widespread regional animosity. But, this defense is now being extended as a rationale for the existence of SAARC. To insulate SAARC from undue challenges, comparisons with the accomplishments of EU and ASEAN are discouraged. But by depriving SAARC activities a minimum denominator for genuine evaluation, its aspirations are being condensed.
SAARC claims to keep political disagreements out of the regional agenda to allow a congenial climate for dialogue. But, in fact the process of cooperation is challenged by the political uncertainties in the region. By ignoring regional realities SAARC cannot claim to create regional harmony. Moreover, if political disagreements are not discussed across the table, these would lead to greater regional tensions. SAARC defeats the very purpose of a regional forum. SAARC could personalize the process of political dialogue in the region so as to address the specific political contentions without appearing too intrusive with regard to bilateral relations.
Each state in South Asia has specific economic interests to safeguard. The process of economic cooperation needs to take cognizance of these concerns while forging regional economic agreements. Such concerns voiced by some member states are usually projected as mischievous attempts to disrupt the process of economic cooperation. The purpose of economic cooperation is safeguarding the interests of all parties rather than merely achieving a few institutional targets.
According to Barry Buzan, security interdependency means that two states make a hostile or friendly pairing and their behavior is regularly interactive. Buzan has emphasized on one security interdependency in the region, namely India and Pakistan. And this security interdependency has come to dominate the regional strategic discourse for over two decades. For evolving a viable regional security dialogue it is imperative that security concerns of the region are discussed beyond the India-Pakistan framework. Issues of political assassinations, sectarian violence, democratic instability, armed insurgency are challenges faced by all states in South Asia. A regional analysis of such threats and remedial measures needs to figure in the regional security dialogue.
Instead of the lengthy deliberations made at recent SAARC Standing Committee and Council of Ministers meetings in December 2007, the 15th SAARC Summit will merely need to comprehend the above stated facts. SAARC claims to have entered the implementation phase; the focus should now be on framing, refining and implementing general conventions of cooperation in the region, rather than implementing isolated programmes of cooperation. Hopefully in future, the member states will more actively invest to build a culture of cooperation in South Asia.
The article was also published at http://www.ipcs.org/South_Asia_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2481&country=1016&status=article&mod=a
The Charter of SAARC does not categorize the forum as an explicit political or economic or strategic grouping. Its imprecise character was considered an asset; a flexibility which could adapt to emerging demands. The initial phase justified this approach, given the recent origin of the nation-state system in South Asia. But South Asian countries have not worked towards evolving a specific mandate for the regional forum. Even 22 years after its formation the SAARC programme remains as amorphous and vague as it was in 1985.
Regionalism refers to intensifying political, economic or strategic processes of cooperation among states. Such intensification and coordination of activities is not visible in the SAARC. There has been multiplication of institutional structures and proliferation of regional meetings, but few successes in terms of specific action-based programmes. Regional dialogue is dominated by the negative agenda of thrusting the responsibility for the regional challenges on specific national policies, rather than evolving a mutual approach to address the concerns.
The political goal of cooperation, namely, a political union, may be an ambitious objective for many regional groupings, but convergence of certain political practices which have regional and extra-regional implications could surely be on the agenda. Likewise, an economic union may qualify as the ultimate step in economic cooperation, but a free trade area is a more realizable target. A common defense system for a region is yet a far dream, but a coordinated defense strategy for strategic concerns has been evolved by regional groupings around the world.
If South Asian cooperation is measured against these political, economic or strategic yard sticks, the record would be extremely unimpressive. The saddest part is not that SAARC has not achieved the desired results in these spheres, but surprisingly SAARC has not even taken the initial steps in that direction. The strongest defense in favor of SAARC is its ability to survive despite widespread regional animosity. But, this defense is now being extended as a rationale for the existence of SAARC. To insulate SAARC from undue challenges, comparisons with the accomplishments of EU and ASEAN are discouraged. But by depriving SAARC activities a minimum denominator for genuine evaluation, its aspirations are being condensed.
SAARC claims to keep political disagreements out of the regional agenda to allow a congenial climate for dialogue. But, in fact the process of cooperation is challenged by the political uncertainties in the region. By ignoring regional realities SAARC cannot claim to create regional harmony. Moreover, if political disagreements are not discussed across the table, these would lead to greater regional tensions. SAARC defeats the very purpose of a regional forum. SAARC could personalize the process of political dialogue in the region so as to address the specific political contentions without appearing too intrusive with regard to bilateral relations.
Each state in South Asia has specific economic interests to safeguard. The process of economic cooperation needs to take cognizance of these concerns while forging regional economic agreements. Such concerns voiced by some member states are usually projected as mischievous attempts to disrupt the process of economic cooperation. The purpose of economic cooperation is safeguarding the interests of all parties rather than merely achieving a few institutional targets.
According to Barry Buzan, security interdependency means that two states make a hostile or friendly pairing and their behavior is regularly interactive. Buzan has emphasized on one security interdependency in the region, namely India and Pakistan. And this security interdependency has come to dominate the regional strategic discourse for over two decades. For evolving a viable regional security dialogue it is imperative that security concerns of the region are discussed beyond the India-Pakistan framework. Issues of political assassinations, sectarian violence, democratic instability, armed insurgency are challenges faced by all states in South Asia. A regional analysis of such threats and remedial measures needs to figure in the regional security dialogue.
Instead of the lengthy deliberations made at recent SAARC Standing Committee and Council of Ministers meetings in December 2007, the 15th SAARC Summit will merely need to comprehend the above stated facts. SAARC claims to have entered the implementation phase; the focus should now be on framing, refining and implementing general conventions of cooperation in the region, rather than implementing isolated programmes of cooperation. Hopefully in future, the member states will more actively invest to build a culture of cooperation in South Asia.
The article was also published at http://www.ipcs.org/South_Asia_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2481&country=1016&status=article&mod=a
Thursday, April 10, 2008
Public diplomacy: lessons for the conduct of Indian foreign policy
The Realist dictum that power struggle would dominate relations among states still holds ground. Conflictual relations and clash of national interests continues to involve states in different forms of diplomacy. As the contours of the power struggle are changing so are the tools of diplomacy. Public diplomacy is fast emerging as the essential tool for serving national interest in international politics. Public diplomacy refers to the art of serving national interest by informing, influencing and understanding foreign audiences. Educational, cultural, social and diverse media activities constitute the core of public diplomacy.
In May 2006 India’s Ministry of External Affairs established the Public Diplomacy Office aimed to educate the global and domestic opinion on key policy issues and project a better image of the country. It is modeled on the Public Diplomacy Division of the US State Department. The target audience is domestic and international think-tanks, faculties in institutes of higher learning, press clubs and editors of local and foreign newspapers. The public diplomacy efforts by India have turned out to be merely an organizational refinement of the Ministry of External Affairs, rather than a serious attempt at utilizing the benefits possibly accrued through public diplomacy. It is important for the Ministry of External Affairs to realize certain essential requisites of conducting public diplomacy before tangible results can be expected.
Public diplomacy is not merely a generic activity aimed at disseminating data about India. It is not expected to be limited to detailing the economic growth and industrial potential of the country and its democratic credentials. Public diplomacy is a target oriented activity; both in terms of objectives and audience. Positive attributes of the country needs to be projected through the right strategy at the right time in the right place to serve national interest.
It is essentially pro-active rather than reactive. The purpose of public diplomacy is to prepare the ground for launching a policy campaign rather than being limited to explaining the details of the campaign.
It does not merely seek to influence the public and governments of others countries but is also an exercise in informing the host government about the perceptions of others. Hence such diplomacy is not limited to gathering laurels for policy choices but also examining the failures resulting from complicated strategic options.
Public diplomacy efforts by the Government of India have been highly cosmetic and barely enlightening. The public diplomacy division has conducted conferences across the country on various themes with the declared objective of receiving feedback from experts and providing information to the public. The agenda chalked out for these conferences and the speakers invited simply reassert the official thinking rarely attracting popular attention. The Public Diplomacy Division held a conference on the “Connectivity in SAARC” in Kolkata last year with the apparent objective to understand the views of the eastern states on the issue, but invited all speakers from New Delhi.
The “Incredible India” banner on a hop-on hop-off New York Bus simply depicts a roaring loin; the International Media Press Opinion section in the Ministry of External Affairs website show no results for the year 2007 and 2008; the efforts of the India Brand Equity Foundation- a private-public partnership between the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Confederation of Indian Industries- are commendable as a information provider on economic opportunities in India rather than a strategic public diplomacy tool; can the activities of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, without centers in the US and China be compared to the British Council or Swiss Pro Helvetia; these efforts clearly show that the public diplomacy efforts by the Government of India are neither issue oriented nor target specific.
The government of India has not used the tool of public diplomacy in managing concerns like the Indo-US nuclear deal, Chinese actions in Tibet, Pakistan’s assistance to the Taliban in Afghanistan, refugee influx from Bangladesh. Dissemination of authentic data on these issues in a manner serving the national interests of India could help to garner more support for the policy choices. Public diplomacy offers the opportunity to create a favorable environment whereby tough decisions can be executed with minimum resistance. The concept of ‘information warrior’ and ‘perception manager’ gaining prominence in the US needs to inspire the conduct of public diplomacy in India.
In an era where the most successful advertising agencies are running the public diplomacy efforts of countries like the US, the UK and China, efforts by India are rudimentary at best. Innovativeness, foresight, marketing blitz, strategic planning and psychological management are imperative for any successful public diplomacy effort. India needs to realize that public diplomacy is not simply meant to be an office space in the South Block, but a connecting link and strategic leverage in our foreign policy.
(The article is also avaliable at http://www.ipcs.org/)
In May 2006 India’s Ministry of External Affairs established the Public Diplomacy Office aimed to educate the global and domestic opinion on key policy issues and project a better image of the country. It is modeled on the Public Diplomacy Division of the US State Department. The target audience is domestic and international think-tanks, faculties in institutes of higher learning, press clubs and editors of local and foreign newspapers. The public diplomacy efforts by India have turned out to be merely an organizational refinement of the Ministry of External Affairs, rather than a serious attempt at utilizing the benefits possibly accrued through public diplomacy. It is important for the Ministry of External Affairs to realize certain essential requisites of conducting public diplomacy before tangible results can be expected.
Public diplomacy is not merely a generic activity aimed at disseminating data about India. It is not expected to be limited to detailing the economic growth and industrial potential of the country and its democratic credentials. Public diplomacy is a target oriented activity; both in terms of objectives and audience. Positive attributes of the country needs to be projected through the right strategy at the right time in the right place to serve national interest.
It is essentially pro-active rather than reactive. The purpose of public diplomacy is to prepare the ground for launching a policy campaign rather than being limited to explaining the details of the campaign.
It does not merely seek to influence the public and governments of others countries but is also an exercise in informing the host government about the perceptions of others. Hence such diplomacy is not limited to gathering laurels for policy choices but also examining the failures resulting from complicated strategic options.
Public diplomacy efforts by the Government of India have been highly cosmetic and barely enlightening. The public diplomacy division has conducted conferences across the country on various themes with the declared objective of receiving feedback from experts and providing information to the public. The agenda chalked out for these conferences and the speakers invited simply reassert the official thinking rarely attracting popular attention. The Public Diplomacy Division held a conference on the “Connectivity in SAARC” in Kolkata last year with the apparent objective to understand the views of the eastern states on the issue, but invited all speakers from New Delhi.
The “Incredible India” banner on a hop-on hop-off New York Bus simply depicts a roaring loin; the International Media Press Opinion section in the Ministry of External Affairs website show no results for the year 2007 and 2008; the efforts of the India Brand Equity Foundation- a private-public partnership between the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Confederation of Indian Industries- are commendable as a information provider on economic opportunities in India rather than a strategic public diplomacy tool; can the activities of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, without centers in the US and China be compared to the British Council or Swiss Pro Helvetia; these efforts clearly show that the public diplomacy efforts by the Government of India are neither issue oriented nor target specific.
The government of India has not used the tool of public diplomacy in managing concerns like the Indo-US nuclear deal, Chinese actions in Tibet, Pakistan’s assistance to the Taliban in Afghanistan, refugee influx from Bangladesh. Dissemination of authentic data on these issues in a manner serving the national interests of India could help to garner more support for the policy choices. Public diplomacy offers the opportunity to create a favorable environment whereby tough decisions can be executed with minimum resistance. The concept of ‘information warrior’ and ‘perception manager’ gaining prominence in the US needs to inspire the conduct of public diplomacy in India.
In an era where the most successful advertising agencies are running the public diplomacy efforts of countries like the US, the UK and China, efforts by India are rudimentary at best. Innovativeness, foresight, marketing blitz, strategic planning and psychological management are imperative for any successful public diplomacy effort. India needs to realize that public diplomacy is not simply meant to be an office space in the South Block, but a connecting link and strategic leverage in our foreign policy.
(The article is also avaliable at http://www.ipcs.org/)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
